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Abstract—Radiology Information Systems (RIS) and Picture 
Archiving and Communication systems (PACS) are used widely 
nowadays to help in the workflow management in radiology 
departments. Different architectures have been developed and 
several workflows are in use in different hospitals even for the 
same system. Effective safety analysis tools are needed to ensure 
the reliability of these high-risk workflows, because errors that 
may happen through routine workflow propagate within the 
workflow to result in harmful failures of the system’s output. 
With this prevalence of RIS/PACS in healthcare institutions, 
there is a growing need to analyse their safety. This paper showed 
how to apply a software technology called Hierarchically-
Performed Hazard Origin and Propagation Studies (HiP-HOPS) 
to analyse the safety of RIS/PACS workflows. 
The results of using HiP-HOPS comprised identification of the 
root causes of hazardous workflow failures that may put patient’s 
life at risk.  
We concluded that HiP-HOPS is applicable to this area of 
healthcare and is able to present added value through the detailed 
information on possible failures both their causes and effects. 
Therefore, it has the potential to improve the safety of RIS/PACS 
workflows and other clinical workflows. 
Keywords—clinical workflows; safety analysis; radiology; HiP-
HOPS 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Radiology Information Systems (RIS) and Picture Archiving 
and Communication Systems (PACS) technology has advanced 
dramatically in recent years, including the technology of 
acquiring, storing, retrieving, displaying, and distributing 
clinical images [1]. It has become a mature technology and has 
been commonly implemented in a number of developed 
countries [2]. Different systems have been designed and 
developed to assist different workflows in the radiology 
departments in several hospitals. In Jordan for example, 
RIS/PACS are implemented in a number of private, government, 
and military hospitals. To investigate the concerns that medical 
staff have due to the adoption of RIS/PACS systems, we 
conducted a number of interviews in one of the Jordanian 
hospitals. These were followed by another set of interviews to 
document the workflow in the radiology department in the same 
hospital, where RIS/PACS has been adopted. We found that 
faults and errors in the workflows might lead to harmful failures 
in the outputs (e.g. producing a report that has an incorrect 
description of the patient’s situation, or leading to undesired 
reactions by the patient). Having the wrong report potentially 
results in an incorrect diagnosis and treatment, placing the 
patient’s life at risk, while the effect of having unwanted side 
effects by the patient varies depending on how serious these 
effects are.  
With this prevalence of RIS/PACS in healthcare institutions, 
there is a growing need to analyse their workflow safety, both 
ensuring the safety of the workflow design and the safety during 
the operational phase. In other words, securing the design of the 
theoretical workflow in terms of safety issues, and then making 
sure about following this workflow in the operational phase. 
Analysing and modelling the workflow plays an important role 
in medical information technology projects, as the 
implementation of these systems requires an  understanding of 
the processes involved in them [3]. 
A RIS as defined by [4] is a computer system designed to 
support operational workflow and business analysis within a 
radiology department; it is a repository of patient data and 
reports which contributes to the electronic patient record (EPR) 
or electronic health record (EHR). [4] described the RIS as an 
imaging information system since it supports many additional 
specialists in areas including nuclear medicine, radiotherapy, 
and endoscopy. 
As a RIS contributes to EHRs, then any errors in these 
systems propagate to affect the EHRs, which may put clinicians 
in a situation where they make wrong diagnosis and 
consequently put patients’ lives at risk.  
The interviews showed that one of the main concerns about 
adopting the RIS/PACS systems is the potential lack of 
reliability and thus lack of safety of these systems; this is due to 
the difference between the theoretical workflow and the 
operational workflow. Furthermore, even the theoretical 
workflow possibly has many problems with its safety, as where 
the safety issue was not addressed specifically during the 
workflow design. This leads to output failures of different parts 
of the workflow and eventually failure of the final output of the 
system. These failures of outputs can be defined by output 
deviations, where an output deviation outlines a set of Boolean 
expressions that shows the causes of the output failure, and the 
relationships between them. These causes can involve internal 
failures, input deviations, or both. 
There is a scarcity of published literature addressing the 
problem of analysing clinical workflows and its safety. It is 
uncommon to have a formal automated safety analysis in 
healthcare for the management of clinical workflows such as the 
workflow within the radiology department. Little information is 
available regarding operational errors in RIS/PACS workflows 
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(e.g. [5]). Safety of clinical workflows needs an intensive 
investigation and analysis, as well as clear approaches for this 
investigation and analysis. Lessons learned by industry in safety 
analysis have the potential to help healthcare organisations to 
avoid prospective hazards.  
Research to date has not identified efficient automated 
approaches for workflow errors risk reduction. Many aspects of 
RIS/PACS design can be changed through the safety analysis of 
the workflow, as a flawed workflow design has the potential to 
decrease the efficiency and increase user errors during the 
operational phase of the workflow. 
In the face of these limitations, this paper identifies potential 
significant errors in a RIS/PACS workflow by means of the 
following: 
 Construction of a safety analysis from the results of an 
empirical study. 
 Using the results of the empirical study to document and 
model both the detailed processes and the in depth tasks of 
one failure scenario of a RIS/PACS system’s workflow.  
 Collecting data regarding occurrence of the workflow errors 
and their prevention in the same scenario environment. 
 Discussing current approaches to reduce the risk of errors in 
the RIS/PACS workflow. 
 Proposing a new approach for the safety analysis of 
RIS/PACS workflow.    
II. AN INTEGRATED APPROACH FOR SAFETY ANALAYSIS OF  
RIS/PACS WORKFLOW 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) [6] is a common safety analysis 
technique through which root causes of an undesired event are 
identified. It is a deductive technique which determines how an 
undesired event (often termed the top event) can be caused by 
lower level failures (or events) or their combinations. 
Quantitative analysis of the FTA can be implemented to 
calculate the probability of the top event and qualitative analysis 
is performed to identify the necessary and sufficient 
combinations of events which caused the top event (termed 
Minimal Cut Sets (MCS)). Failure Mode and Effect Analysis 
(FMEA), on the other hand, is an inductive safety analysis 
technique that examines the effect of lower level (component) 
failures towards the higher-level system failures. FTA and 
FMEA has a wide use in exploring and analysing healthcare 
issues related to patient safety (e.g. [7]; [8]; [5]), and they 
showed their ability to analyse clinical processes. Automated 
FTA and FMEA would present and provide more efficiency in 
analysing clinical processes. 
Hierarchically-Performed Hazard Origin and Propagation 
Studies (HiP-HOPS) which was initially proposed by [9], is a 
state-of-the-art technique, which has been prominently used in 
mechanical systems to effectively identify weak points in 
system design. It is a predictive safety analysis technique which 
enables semi-automated FTA and FMEA. In other words, it 
incorporates, automates, and integrates a number of classical 
techniques.  
HiP-HOPS works in combination with a number of 
frequently used system modelling tools or packages (e.g. Matlab 
Simulink), from which it receives block diagrams of systems 
being analysed and associated failure behaviour.  It includes 
three main phases: a modelling phase, a synthesis phase, and an 
analysis phase where MCSs and FMEA are generated. The 
process starts when designers build a model of the system, then 
they annotate the model and its components with detailed failure 
information. Internal failure information can be annotated into 
the components as a set of expressions that are manually added 
to each component to describe how failures of the component 
output can be caused by a combination of an input failure and/or 
by internal malfunctions of the component itself.  
HiP-HOPS can in general be applied to systems that involve 
data, information or material flow. However, in our case 
“components”  may represent clinical processes, humans, tasks,  
or any other components of a clinical workflow architecture. 
  HiP-HOPS was used to analyse the safety of the workflow 
of a home Telemonitoring system in  [10]. This paper uses HiP-
HOPS to conduct safety analysis of a RIS/PACS workflow. The 
result of the analysis is the root causes of different failures, and 
their direct and indirect effects on both the workflow and the 
patients themselves. 
III. CASE STUDY 
A. System Architecture and System Workflow 
The ideal architecture for a RIS has a hospital information 
system (HIS) which works as a master patient index, where data 
goes immediately to the RIS without the need for a technologist 
to enter any data.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
In our case, the hospital combined the RIS and PACS and 
has them as a stand-alone departmental radiology system. They 
have a non-complete HIS that does not have full functionality 
and is not connected to the RIS. All the data needs to be entered 
in the RIS by the clinicians. The information to be entered 
includes the following: Patient name, Patient National Number, 
Date of Birth (DoB), Age, Address, Patient medical 
Information, and Order Information. 
After the above information is entered into the RIS either by 
the clinician (as in our case) or by coming immediately from the 
HIS, then this information (which includes patient’s medical, 
administrative, demographics, and billing information) is kept in 
the RIS, in addition to the information which is added at the RIS 
to identify the examination order. These may include the 
following: Order ID, Order Description, Scheduling, Patient 
Arrival Information, and Examination Room Scheduling. 
This discussion considers the case where the clinician enters 
part of the information into the RIS, and there is some 
information that is entered into the RIS by another party who 
might be a radiologist. After that, the output of the RIS goes to 
the modality worklist (MWL) where the orders are scheduled to 
be sent to the image acquisition modality. Here at the image 
acquisition modality, there is no chance for human error as the 
data comes immediately from the RIS. However, this database, 
which has all the scheduling information and orders information, 
is open to hardware and software errors. At the image 
acquisition modality the patient is supposed to have the 
examination that is specified in the order.  The output of the 
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image acquisition modality is patient id, patient name and the 
image itself. 
After that, these outputs are sent automatically to the PACS 
which archives them and then sends them to the diagnostic 
workstation to be seen by the radiologist. The radiologist is now 
able to interpret examinations from several clinical sites and/or 
hospitals (in the case of Teleradiology), and produce a report as 
an output. This report is to be passed to the clinician to make the 
diagnoses and give a medicine or recommend for another 
procedure such as an operation. 
The following figure shows the workflow within the system. 
The information from the EHR is relayed back to the HIS 
component.  
 
Figure 1: RIS/PACS Workflow 
The EHR has the following information: 
 
Figure 2: EHR Component 
This paper considers one of the workflow scenarios; the 
purpose is to analyse possible failures of this scenario and to find 
out the root causes of these failures. This scenario is the 
workflow for a computerised tomography (CT) scanner. A CT 
scanner creates cross-sectional images of the body using X-rays; 
the result is a very detailed 3D view of the body interior. CT 
scans are used to make a cancer diagnosis or assess the effects 
of cancer treatment. 
When the patient sees the clinician, the clinician decides if 
there is a need for a CT scan. Once a CT scan is recommended, 
the risk of exposure to radiation is considered before deciding to 
send the patient to the exam. This is because the accumulative 
amount of radiation the patient is exposed to has a potential risk 
for the patient, so clinicians recommend it when they think that 
the benefits will exceed possible risks. In order to consider the 
amount of radiation, in most cases the date of the last CT scan 
must be considered by the clinician before such a decision can 
be confirmed. Moreover, a pregnancy check must be done to 
make sure that the woman who will start the exam is not 
pregnant. 
   Commonly, patients who will receive a CT scan must 
follow certain preparation guidelines. These include no eating 
for two hours before the appointment, and drinking 500 ml of 
water over this time. The water is useful to hydrate the patient 
before having the Contrast Media (CM) for the CT scan. 
Another preparation guideline is to ask the patient to drink 
another 500 ml of water after arriving to the waiting area. It also 
helps to show the bladder on the scan.   
Verbal verification by the radiologist is needed to check 
these preparations with the patient together with other 
preparations such as ensuring there is no metal present (e.g. 
wearing of a metal belt, or jewellery or having an internal device 
inside their bodies). Moreover, verbal verification of the 
patient’s DoB at this point plays an important role in correcting 
any previous errors in the DoB, as the DoB is important in 
determining the amount of CM and the amount of radiation. 
Some patients may require a blood test before CM can be given. 
An injection of the contrast is often given before or 
throughout the scan. CM contains iodine and appears as white 
areas on the scans, which help the radiologist to differentiate 
between certain organs or tissues and the other structures. The 
contrast may be ingested as a drink, or injected around the 
required area, or given via a cannula which is placed in the 
patient’s arm prior to the scan. Again, verbal verification is 
required here to confirm any allergies and medications that the 
patient takes in order to judge the suitability of the injection and 
to minimise interactions with other medications.  
The CM is modelled as a separate component:  
 
Figure 3: The CM Component 
Typically, people who feel claustrophobic do not have 
problems with CT scan as they might have with other scans, like 
Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI). However, the radiographer 
should check this with the patient before the scan, as if the 
patient thinks that he is expecting to feel this way then an 
injection may be given before the scan to calm the patient. 
After the scan is finished, the patient should be asked to wait 
for an hour at least after the injection to make sure the patient is 
in good health, and he/she did not have allergic reaction to the 
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CM injection, because people sometimes have different 
reactions; in these circumstances, medical staff should be able 
to manage different reactions appropriately. The radiologist then 
should give some instructions to the patient to follow once he 
goes home, for example, again asking the patient to drink 500ml 
of water to rehydrate the body after the CM injection.   
B. Errors Propagation is the cause of failures 
Errors may happen at any point where there is a data entry. 
This paper focuses on the failures caused by DoB errors in the 
CT scan workflow scenario.  
A CT scan is considered as a safe procedure, although there 
can be reactions to contrast media CM which usually cannot be 
predicted [11]. 
For example, the dose of contrast media which is given to 
the patients is different for adults and children. Therefore, date 
of birth is an important factor for specifying the amount of CM 
to administer. Giving the patient an overdose of CM has 
reactions that affect patient health and put the patient in a 
hazardous situation.  
Faults may occur at different points in the workflow and 
need to be identified. Failure annotation is performed using the 
HiP-HOPS tool; all the components need to be annotated with 
possible faults. HiP-HOPS then analyses the model to give the 
fault trees that detects the possible failures and provide the root 
causes for them. In addition, it provides us with information 
about their effects on the output of the workflow. 
C. Failure Annotation 
The interview’s data are analysed to document the 
RIS/PACS system’s workflow. Then the documented 
information is used to model the workflow to enable the 
automated analysis. After that, the model is extended with 
failure information for several scenarios. This failure 
information describes how a failure in the component output is 
caused by a propagation of failure from the component input or 
the internal malfunction of the component itself. Failure is 
represented in the format of “FailureType-
ComponentName.ComponentPort” in HiP-HOPS.  
The first scenario analysis focuses on having side effects or 
bad reactions by the patient. As described by the system 
architecture, the effect on the patient is considered as an ‘output’ 
component. This failure is represented by the value failure of the 
patient component, and so is referred to as V-Patient.Out1.  
The patient’s DoB is entered into HIS together with other 
information. Value failure of DoB which could be caused by 
wrong data entry is represented as V-DoB_out, also omission of 
the DoB causes problems and it is classified here as output 
deviation of the HIS. Omission of DoB is represented here as O-
DoB_out. Moreover, HIS internal malfunctions can cause the 
output failures of the HIS; these are represented as HWError, 
SWError, and DataEntryError. 
Similarly, the clinician — who is included in the workflow 
as a separate component — can have output deviations. 
Clinician might make data entry errors which are represented 
here as IDDataEntryError or DoBDataEntryError. The output 
deviations are represented as V-PatientID_out and V-DoB_out. 
RIS internal malfunctions may include software or hardware 
malfunction, represented as HWError, SWError. RIS as well as 
potentially  receiving the wrong DoB from the Clinician, 
represented as DoBDataEntryError. In addition to these 
malfunctions, RIS may suffer from failure of the preparation 
data, which is PrpDataEntryError. Therefore, output deviations 
at RIS could be the omission of DoB or having the wrong DoB 
or having the wrong preparation information or omission of 
preparation information; these are represented respectively as: 
O-DoB_out, V-DoB_out, V-PatientPreparationInfo, and O-
PatientPreparationInfo. 
ModalityWorkList is a database, which keeps orders’ 
scheduling information and patients’ information. It can have 
two basic events, which are software error or hardware error. 
These are represented as SWError and HWError respectively. 
Each of the ModalityWorklist inputs has its own failure but in 
the first scenario, some failures have been considered and the 
others are ignored as they are assumed to be free from failures. 
The failures which are to be analysed are: the failure of the value 
of the DoB and the failure of the preparation information output 
either as a value failure or omission of this value. These are 
represented as V-DoB_out, V-Prep_out, and O-Prep_out. 
When it comes to the image acquisition modality itself, at 
the time of the test the radiologist should verify some 
information with the patient, e.g. DoB, name, and preparations 
for the test. The process of verbal verification is represented as 
a separate component which may have two basic events, both 
human errors; they are represented as: DoBHumanError and 
PrepHumanError. Failures of the output of this component are 
represented as: O-DOBVer and O-PrepVer. 
Fixing the cannula for the contrast medium is considered as 
well as a separate component, and annotated with the failures 
that might be a human error (represented as HumanError); the 
output failure of this component is represented as V-Out1.  
The CM dose is considered as a subcomponent of the image 
acquisition modality and failure of this is giving the wrong dose 
for the patient. This failure is represented as V-Dose, which can 
be caused by either wrong dose calculation or wrong 
measurement. Other reactions are considered as well as 
subcomponents of the image acquisition modality component, 
which may have a failure that is represented as V-Reaction, 
where the patient has some reactions or Side effects when he is 
not supposed to have them. These kinds of reactions that happen 
according to not following the preparation guidelines by the 
patient are separated from the CM dose-dependent reactions. 
The output of the CMDose component and OtherReactions 
component goes to the Reaction component. This separate 
component is annotated as well with possible failures.  
The Reactions component is connected to the patient who is 
having these reactions. The image output is connected to the 
PACS component that receives the images and archives them 
into a database.  
We did not annotate both the PACS and the diagnostic 
workstations component with failure information for the 
purpose of this scenario. We assumed that they only propagate 
failures. A comprehensive analysis must consider failures of 
these components and annotate them with all possible errors to 
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get the root causes for the other possible failures of the 
workflow. 
There are other scenarios that may possibly cause defective 
results, but again, for simplicity, they are not covered in this 
paper. For example, when the patient gives information to the 
clinician, the patient might not tell the right information about 
his situation and the clinician might not check. Those two 
conditions together result in creating the wrong history for the 
patient. When the clinician has the wrong information, he or she 
will ask for the wrong exam order that in turn causes the wrong 
examination description. At the time of the examination, if the 
patient did not tell and the radiographer did not verify this, and 
he or she has the wrong exam description, these conditions 
together might give a false report for the patient, which results 
in an incorrect procedure or the wrong medication. 
Another failure that can potentially cause patient harm but is 
not considered in this paper is when images are mislabelled for 
the wrong patient and/or the wrong study. These kinds of 
failures result in images that are incorrectly associated with the 
patient’s EHR and may lead to incorrect diagnoses, medication, 
or procedures. 
Other failures might happen because of an incorrect entry for 
the DoB of the patient, which occurs when the clinician enters 
the wrong DoB in both the HIS and the RIS. These faults 
together result in the wrong DoB of the patient which cause an 
incorrect dose of both radiation and the CM. Here the patient is 
under the risk of extra dose of radiation and dose dependent 
reactions of CM. The dose dependent reactions of CM are 
analysed in this paper. 
D. Analysis Results 
We annotated the components of the model with the 
corresponding failure information and then performed the root 
cause analysis. HiP-HOPS synthesises and analyses the system 
fault trees and produces the FTA and FMEA results, which 
shows how the value failure in an input and the component 
failures (or their combinations) can lead to the failure in causing 
unintended reactions or side effects towards the patients.  
The following figure shows the FTA result. For clarity, V-
Reaction is represented as Unintended Reaction in the FTA and 
FMEA table: 
Unintended Reactions
DoB Verification Error 
RIS DOB
 Data Entry Error
HIS DoB 
Data Entry Error
Clinician DoB 
Data Entry Error
Preparation
 Verification 
Error
RIS Preparation 
Data Entry Error
Cannula Fixation Error
Wrong Dose of CM
Wrong DoB
Wrong Measurements
Wrong Dose 
Calculation
Human Error
Wrong Preparation of 
Patient 
 
Figure 4: FTA Result 
The following list shows the MCS [6] from the FTA: 
 
Table 1: MCS from FTA 
The following table shows the resulting FMEA table of the 
direct and further effects: 
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Table 2: FMEA Table 
To summarise, the FTA and FMEA results show that the 
following failures may lead to the failure of the first scenario 
(which is in this case getting unwanted reactions by the patient):  
 Human error in fixing the cannula for the CM, where the 
radiologist or the nurse makes an error in placing the 
cannula prior the scan. This mistake cause problems for the 
patient as the CM is injected through the scan, which might 
lead to both side effects of the CM or extra dose of 
radiation because radiologist might need to repeat the scan. 
 Data entry error for the DoB by the clinician combined 
with an error in the verbal verification of the DoB by the 
radiologist at the time of the scanning. This combination of 
errors might lead to an extra dose of radiation and/or extra 
dose of CM, which may put patient’s life at risk.  
 Data entry error for the DoB by the radiologist combined 
with an error in the verbal verification of the DoB by the 
radiologist at the time of the scanning. Again this focuses 
our attention on the importance of the verification of the 
DoB by the radiologist at the time of the scanning. 
 Data entry error for the preparation guidelines by the 
radiologist combined with an error in the verbal 
verification of the preparation guidelines by the radiologist 
at the time of the scanning. This means, if the patient 
received the wrong preparation guidelines or did not 
receive them at all, then at the time of the scanning, if the 
radiologist does not make sure about their accuracy (and 
whether they were followed by the patient or not), the 
patient will experience the reactions. 
 Data entry error for the DoB in the HIS combined with an 
error in the verbal verification of the DoB by the 
radiologist at the time of the scanning. 
 Wrong measurements to calculate the dose of CM can 
directly cause the unwanted reactions. This might happen 
because of not understanding the units of measurements, or 
using wrong equipment to measure the dosages.  
 Human error in calculating the dose can directly cause the 
reactions. This may happen through making mistakes in 
calculations that result in wrong dose. 
This means that if there is any error in the data entry in HIS, 
clinician, and the RIS, combined with a situation where the 
radiologist does not verify (or verifies incorrectly) the data for 
DoB or preparation information, the unintended reactions 
towards the patient will occur. These errors can be avoided by 
adding extra functionality to the HIS or RIS or both of them (for 
example, bar coded patients help to avoid data entry errors by 
radiologists and clinicians). Moreover, adding extra tasks in the 
workflow may help to avoid the errors. 
Human error in fixing the cannula for the CM also contributes 
directly to the unintended reactions. So, radiologists or nurses 
who perform this task should be informed about potential 
failures which it may cause and about their direct and indirect 
effects on the patient. 
E. Validation of the Approach  
Initial data on the applicability of the approach were 
gathered through an informal testing shown positive usability 
and effective results.  
Our results were discussed with experts in the hospital in 
which the data were collected and they appreciated the ability of 
the approach to focus on processes and human errors, as well as 
how this could be employed for several applications in clinical 
workflows. Moreover, having the fact that our analysis results 
are happening in the hospital as actual failures has the potential 
to validate our approach. Our approach drew the map for the root 
causes of these failures. This is the major contribution of this 
work as to date there is a lack of automated tools which allow 
the modelling and analysis of real-world workflows. The 
approach provides an effective means to accomplish this goal, is 
able to provide a valid theoretical frame consisting of modelling 
the processes and sub processes and their error analysis. The 
study findings contribute towards a larger research effort being 
proposed for reducing medical errors and enhancing patient 
safety. 
F. Conclusions and Contributions 
The automated identification of these root causes allows 
greater understanding of the factors contributing to the 
undesired event which can potentially lead to a serious clinical 
risk. This enables the identification of weak points, which could 
then be effectively addressed and improved. 
The simple act of undertaking a safety analysis in this way 
helps to improve understanding of the behavior of the workflow 
and its potential for failure, thus highlighting areas where 
additional checks or amendments to the workflow need to be 
introduced. The automation then additionally helps deal with 
the complexity and time cost issues, offering benefits over a 
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simple manual analysis. While in this case there were only 
order 2 MCS, more comprehensive analyses might introduce 
even higher order MCS that are even more difficult to spot 
manually, potentially highlighting issues that are not even 
apparent from a manual analysis.  
For example, through the simple structure in this example, 
the application of HiP-HOPS shows the ability to 
systematically assist in the identification of failures in the 
workflow (i.e. failure in the verbal verification or failure in the 
data entry of the DoB) and the identification of the failures in 
the system (i.e. hardware or software error in the MWL). This 
information can be used to guide the improvement in the design 
of both the system and the workflow. The system can be 
improved by targeting the areas where highly-reliable 
components and fault tolerant mechanisms can be prioritised 
and introduced to make the architecture more robust and fault 
tolerant. 
Moreover, the workflow can be improved by designing the 
workflow in a way which takes the safety analysis into 
consideration and to use the results of the analysis to target 
areas where reliable components (in this case the components 
are processes and tasks) can be introduced. The workflow 
should have an exact determination of the processes, tasks, and 
the procedures which must be done by each party. 
Having this detailed workflow with a detailed analysis of the 
failure behaviour can enable healthcare organisations to 
develop material to be used by medical staff in safety training 
workshops. These workshops should help the medical staff to 
build safety awareness that may be useful to avoid the expected 
failures in the workflow. 
Using HiP-HOPS in workflow analysis in general has the 
potential to give effective analysis by detecting possible design 
flaws early before serious problems happen. This also helps to 
provide the medical staff the awareness they require and aids in 
redesigning the workflow to produce an effective and fault free 
workflow. 
Moreover, such modelling of the workflow and the analysis 
results can also be used as an educational tool for training of 
radiologists, nurses, and clinicians. This  helps the trainees in 
identifying errors and preventing the potential errors from 
leading to adverse events. 
   The example presented in this paper is based on one scenario, 
while different scenarios need to be modelled and analysed to 
get a comprehensive analysis of the workflow. Moreover, 
conducting research of this nature on only one location is 
limiting, and having more sites opens a wider range of failures 
determination. 
G. Future Research 
We have done this work as a part of a clinical workflow 
safety analysis project at University of Hull. Here in this paper 
we showed how to use HiP-HOPS to analyse one of the 
RIS/PACS workflow scenarios. This identified the need for 
further investigation with a comprehensive analysis for all the 
scenarios. Moreover, implication of probability analysis in 
future studies may aid in giving a complete analysis, and at this 
point human factors uncertainty needs to be taken into 
consideration (uncertainty in probabilistic analysis due to 
human factors). To conclude, further research is needed to 
enable more valuable recommendations to hospitals on how to 
redesign their workflows with the consideration of workflow 
analysis, how to use the workflow safety analysis results to 
redesign their workflows and to support the medical staff 
awareness culture. This awareness culture is expected to 
contribute in minimising the chances for workflow’s failures.  
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